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Article 4

REPLY

THE NEED FOR REAL STRIKER
REPLACEMENT REFORM
LEONARD BIERMAN*
RAFAEL GELY**

INTRODUCTION
In a recent article in the North CarolinaLaw Review,' Louisiana
State University Law Professor William R. Corbett proposes an
innovative solution to the contentious issue of the right of employers
to permanently replace economic strikers pursuant to the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act").2 Professor Corbett's
proposal is based on two arguments. First, he argues that the current
legal distinction between "economic" and "unfair labor practice"
strikes-whereby employers are prevented from permanently
replacing employees striking over employer unfair labor practices but
may permanently replace employees striking over economic issues--is a useful one and should be maintained 4 Second, Professor
Corbett contends that the basic rule set forth in the United States
Supreme Court's seminal 1938 decision in NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
an employer to hire permanent
Telegraph Co. -allowing
replacement workers for economic strikers-serves as a market check

* Professor, Graduate School of Business, Texas A&M University.
** Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law.

1. William R. Corbett, A Proposalfor ProceduralLimitations on HiringPermanent
StrikerReplacements: "A Far,FarBetter Thing" Than the Workplace FairnessAct, 72 N.C.
L. REv. 813, 886-95 (1994).

2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1988).
3. See generally ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 33941 (1976) (outlining the doctrinal development of this
distinction).
4. Professor Corbett argues that this distinction deters employers' unfair labor
practices. See Corbett, supra note 1, at 830, 866-71.
5. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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on union bargaining demands and should, therefore, also be
preserved.6
Using these two arguments Professor Corbett debunks the need
for substantive changes to the Mackay rule of the kind recently
considered by Congress in the Workplace Fairness Act.7 He instead
proposes the procedural reform of expediting National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") determinations regarding
whether a given strike is an unfair labor practice or an economic
strike.' By expediting this determination, Professor Corbett argues,
both parties to a strike would know, as near to the beginning of the
strike as possible, the technical legal character of the strike.9 This,
he asserts, would enable them to make better decisions concerning the
continuation or termination of the strike and whether to hire
replacement workers for the striking employees. 0
Professor Corbett argues that the effect of this proposal would be
to minimize abuses concerning the use of strikes and the hiring of
permanent replacements by both unions and employers."
By
maintaining the Mackay rule, employers would be protected against
union abuses of their right to strike. By expediting the NLRB's
determination concerning the character of the strike, that is, whether
it is an economic or an unfair labor practice strike, employers would
be able to determine with reasonable certainty whether the hiring of
permanent replacements is permitted. In addition, unions would be
protected in their right to strike insofar as the strike is over an unfair
labor practice, and by expediting the NLRB's decision on this issue,
unions would be able to decide whether to go on strike or to continue
a strike with more complete information.12
Professor Corbett's proposal is highly innovative in its use of
procedural mechanisms to deal with issues regarding the substantive
rights of strikers, employers, and replacement workers. His proposal,
however, raises numerous concerns, particularly in light of policy

6. See Corbett, supra note 1, at 871-76.
7. See H.R. 5, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). This proposed legislation prohibited
employers from hiring or threatening to hire permanent replacement workers during
economic strikes. For a recent overview and discussion of this and related legislative
proposals, see Samuel Estreicher, Collective Bargaining or "Collective Begging"?:
Reflections on AntistrikebreakerLegislation, 93 MICH. L. REv. 577 (1994).
8. Corbett, supra note 1, at 886-95.
9. Id. at 900-02.
10. Id.
11. Id at 867-76.
12. Id. at 900-02.
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developments in the striker replacement area that have occurred since

the publication of his piece. While the recent major league baseball
strike focused public attention on the general issue of employer

hirings of replacement workers, 3 of greater importance from a policy
perspective was President Clinton's March 8, 1995 Executive Order
overturning the application of the Mackay doctrine to federal
contractors. 4 Under this Presidential Executive Order, all significant
federal contractors, including thousands of industrial companies, are
at risk of losing federal government contracts if they hire permanent
striker replacements."
In light of these recent developments, this Article responds to
Professor Corbett's proposals by addressing them in today's new legal
context. First, we examine Professor Corbett's proposal from the
perspective of "internal" and "external" labor markets. 6 We argue
that his proposal is flawed in two important respects. First, we assert
that Professor Corbett's procedural proposals do not in any way
meaningfully address potential problems caused by the Mackay
doctrine with respect to the operation of internal and external labor
markets. Second, even putting the above-referenced market concerns
aside, Professor Corbett's proposed solution is not workable from a
logistical perspective. Under Professor Corbett's proposal, the NLRB,
acting on an expedited basis, would make an initial determination
regarding the "character" of a strike in about forty-five to forty-six
days.'7 The problem, however, is that strikes in the United States
13. See generally Robert L. Rose, Work Week, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1995, at Al
(discussing the schism among baseball fans regarding the use of replacement workers).
14. See Exec. Order No. 12954, 29 C.F.R. § 270.2 (1995); see also Robert L. Rose,
Gore Says Clinton to Sign Order to Bar Contracts to Firms That Replace Strikers, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 21, 1995, at B5 (discussing Vice President Gore's outlining of the proposed
Executive Order to union leaders). A federal appeals court, however, has recently struck
down the President's general authority to promulgate this Executive Order, Chamber of
Commerce v. Reich, No. 95-5242, 1996 WL 39538, at *17 (D.C. Cir. Feb 2, 1990).
President Clinton, though, has stated that he believes the Executive Order is "economically
sound, fair and legal" and instructed the U.S. Justice Department to take "all appropriate
steps" to have the appeals court "decision overturned." See Peter T. Killborn, Clinton
Order DiscouragingReplacement of Strikers Is Overturned, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1996, at
7.
15. The Executive Order applies to companies that have federal contracts of over
$100,000. See Exec. Order No. 12954,29 C.F.R. § 270.2(c) (1995); Exec. Order No. 12954,
29 C.F.R. § 270.2 (1995); see also David Rogers, Clinton Holds 42 Senate Votes to Shield
Orderon Striker-Replacement Workers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1995, at A4 (discussing the
Clinton Administration's ability to sustain a threatened filibuster of a Republican proposal
to withhold funds for the enforcement of its striker replacement executive order).
16. See infra part I.
17. See Corbett, supra note 1, at 892 n.414.
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are, on average, of a much shorter duration.' 8 Indeed, most strikes
will be over before the NLRB gets around to making an "expedited"
decision under Professor Corbett's proposal. Moreover, it seems
highly unlikely that even under the most auspicious of circumstances
the NLRB could make a determination of the kind Professor Corbett
proposes in much less time than the forty-five days or so that
Professor Corbett suggests. Thus, from both a practical perspective
and a theoretical economic perspective, Professor Corbett's recent
proposals regarding striker replacement reform are unworkable. 9
Following this analysis, we review President Clinton's March 8,
1995 Executive Order from the same perspective.' We assert that
in contrast to Professor Corbett's proposal, the Executive Order does
substantively address the striker replacement problem. Nevertheless,
as with our concerns over Professor Corbett's proposal, the Presidential Executive Order does not effectively address the problem of
potential "opportunistic" behavior by the parties. Finally, we briefly
outline an alternative proposal which we feel represents a more
positive reform in this area.21
I. PROFESSOR CORBETT'S PROPOSAL

A. Overview
Professor Corbett argues that although employers should not be
prohibited from hiring permanent replacements, the Mackay doctrine
should be procedurally restricted.' Professor Corbett would restrict
the Mackay doctrine by temporarily limiting employers' ability to hire
permanent replacement workers until an appropriate tribunal has
defined the character of the strike as economic or unfair labor
practice.' If a strike is characterized as an unfair labor practice
strike, the interim ban will be extended, since even under the Mackay
doctrine permanent replacement workers cannot be lawfully hired in
this context.24 If the strike is not so characterized, the ban will be

18.
19.
20.
21.

See
See
See
See

infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
infra parts II and III.
infra part IV.
infra part V.

22. See Corbett, supra note 1, at 886-93.
23. See id
24. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956); see also JAMES B.
ATELSON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS INAMERICAN LABOR LAW 31 (1983) (stating that
if a strike is deemed an unfair labor practice strike, all replacement workers are considered

temporary).

1996]

STRIKER REPLACEMENT REFORM

817

lifted, and the employer will be free to hire permanent replacements
for the striking workers.'
Such temporary bans on the use of permanent replacements and
expedited determinations of the characteristics of a strike do nothing,
however, to prevent "opportunistic behavior" on the part of unions
and employers. Providing employers with the blanket right to hire
permanent replacements makes it very difficult to differentiate
between those situations in which the employer really needs to hire
permanent replacements in order to continue operations, and those
cases in which the employer is arguably taking opportunistic advantage of the situation and hiring permanent replacements as a way
of getting rid of the representative union.26 One solution would be
to overturn the Mackay doctrine and give unions total protection from
the hiring of permanent strike replacements, as the Clinton Administration's Executive Order accomplishes with respect to large
federal contractors,27 but this might subject employers themselves to
opportunistic behavior on the part of unions. This major drawback
seems to exist under current striker replacement law, and Professor
Corbett's proposal fails to address it at all.
B. Internal and External Labor Markets
In order to effectively deal with this previously unaddressed issue,
a distinction should be made between the levels of skill possessed by
the workers involved in the strike. To understand how distinguishing
the level of worker skills sheds some light on the striker replacements
policy debate, we need first to develop the concept of external and
internal labor markets.
The "external market" is where workers seek new jobs, searching
External labor
among different firms for the best conditions.'

25. See Corbett, supra note 1, at 886-93.
26. See infra part II. See generally Note, One Strike and You're Out? Creating an
Efficient Permanent Replacement Doctrine, 106 HARV. L. REV. 669, 674-78 (1993)
(applying internal/external labor market theory to the need to reform the Mackay

doctrine).
27. See Exec. Order No. 12954, 29 C.F.R. § 270.2 (1995).
28. See Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of
Collective Bargaining:An IntroductionandApplication to the Problems of Subcontracting,
PartialClosure,and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349,1353 (1988) [hereinafter Wachter
& Cohen, Collective Bargaining]; George M. Cohen & Michael L. Wachter, Replacing
Striking Workers: The Law and Economics Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY, 43RD ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 109, 109-25 (Bruno
Stein ed., 1990) [hereinafter Cohen & Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers].
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markets are generally deemed to be "efficient," and any government
intervention in this market is likely to "decrease" efficiency.29
Efficiency in the external labor market arguably breaks down,
however, when there is a need for firm-specific training,that is, the
learning of skills clearly specific to a given firm." In such situations,
"internal labor markets" provide an alternative to exclusive reliance
on external labor market analysis.3 By "internalizing" parts of the
employment relationship, firms can potentially encourage workers to
make long-term investments with them, which in turn produces
technological and cost efficiencies for those firms.32 However,
internal labor markets can themselves be inefficient33 because of the
highly "specific" nature of the investments that workers and
employers may be making in each other.34 More precisely, firms
frequently invest heavily in the training of workers, while workers
invest heavily in learning skills that may be applicable only to the
given firm.3" This creates a situation of "sunk investments" on both
sides, investments that may be lost if workers switch jobs or firms
discharge workers.36 To protect these "sunk investments," employers
and workers generally enter into implicit or explicit contracts
regarding them.37 For example, university professors may seek to
"protect" their firm-specific service on various idiosyncratic university

29. See Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining,supra note 28, at 1353.
30. Firm-specific skills are skills that are idiosyncratic to the particular firm and thus
not easily transferable to other firms. General skills, on the other hand, are skills that are
easily transferable among firms in the same industry. Id. at 1355-64. See also GARY
BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 8-29 (2d ed. 1975) (developing the differences between general
and firm-specific worker training); Augustine A. Lado & Mary C. Wilson, Human
Resource Systems andSustainedCompetitive Advantage: A Competency-BasedPerspective,
19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 699, 704-05 (1994) (discussing the creation of internal labor
markets and investments in firm-specific human capital).
31. See Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining,supra note 28, at 1355-57.
32. Id.at 1356.
33. See Cohen & Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers, supranote 28, at 114; see also
Michael L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor Markets, in
THE ECONOMICS OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 86-108 (Daniel J.B. Mitchell &
Mahmood A. Zaidi eds., 1990) (discussing the efficiency aspects of internal labor markets
in terms of the trade-off made by employees and employers).
34. See Cohen & Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers, supra note 28, at 114-15.
35. ld. at 114.
36. Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining,supra note 28, at 1360 n.43 ("Sunk
investments are investments that have already occurred and cannot be recalled."); see also
Stewart J. Schwab, Life Cycle Justice: AccommodatingJust Cause andEmployment at Will,
92 MICH L. REv. 8, 13 (1993) (discussing how internal labor market investments create a
"lock in" effect for both employees and employers).
37. Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining,supra note 28, at 1360-61.
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committees by obtaining tenure or other forms of explicit or implicit

job security at the university.3 8
Opportunistic behavior appears when either party attempts to

breach these implicit or explicit contracts.39 In such situations, one
party can be seen as trying to "expropriate" the returns or "rents"
that the other party expects out of her investments.'

Workers

generally make firm-specific investments early in their careers and
then recoup such investments as they age.41 The employee invests

by perhaps agreeing to a below-market wage early in her career, with
the expectation that later on she will receive above-market compen-

sation.42 For example, an employee may, early in her career, engage
in learning a skill that is specific to a particular employer. While
doing this, she will likely agree to receive a below-market wage with
the expectation that later on she will be permitted to stay in the firm
and recover her investment in the form of above-market compen-

sation.

However, if the employer terminates the employment

relationship after the employee has learned the skill and the employer

has recovered its investment, but before the employee is able to
recover her investment, the employee's investment will be lost.43

38. See generally RICHARD P. CHAIT & ANDREW T. FORD, BEYOND TRADITIONAL
TENURE (1982) (analyzing both traditional tenure programs and modified or alternative
programs in the university setting); BARDWELL L. SMITH, THE TENURE DEBATE (1973)
(discussing theories supporting and criticizing the institution of academic tenure systems);
see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972) (discussing tenure as a
"property" right); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972) (stating that a junior
college teacher with long service may have some sort of "property" interest in his job, even
absent a formal "tenure" system at the college).
39. See Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining,supra note 28, at 1360-64.
40. Id.
41. Id In particular, Wachter & Cohen argue that "[w]orkers make sunk investments
in their jobs by agreeing to long-term implicit contracts that provide for deferred compensation, that is, below-market wages at early stages of employment and above-market wages
at later stages." Al. at 1360.
42. Id.at 1360-64.
43. Id.While the economics of major league baseball are rather unique, the model
developed above does, to some extent, seem to apply to that industry. Players can be seen
as making industry-specific investments before reaching the major league during college
and minor league baseball, or during the very early stages of their major league careers.
See generally Stephen J. Spurr & William Barber, The Effect of Performanceon a Worker's
Career: Evidencefrom Minor League Baseball, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 692,693-94
(1994) (outlining how minor league clubs currently serve solely as training grounds for
major league clubs). In return for these investments, the players ultimately receive wages
above their "productivity." See id. app. at 706-07 (describing the compensation of minor
league players during the years of the study, 1975-1988). Employer permanent
replacement of players at this stage could be viewed as "opportunistic" since it would
deprive players of the "rents" from their investments. Id.
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Similarly, an employer may invest in an employee's career by
paying her more than her marginal productivity at a very early and/or
later stage of her career, with the expectation that the employer will
44
recover its investment during the employee's mid-career years.
During this middle period, the employee could behave opportunistically and make it difficult for her employer to recover its investment.45
II.

PROCEDURAL SOLUTIONS: No MATCH AGAINST
"OPPORTUNISTIC" BEHAVIOR

We believe that the underlying conflict involved in the striker
replacement decision can be properly characterized by the problem of
opportunistic or "strategic" behavior. Unions and employers are
likely to engage in internal labor market types of arrangements, and
skill specificity and investment make it possible under alternative legal
standards for both the union and the employer to behave opportunistically or strategically. The motivation for either party to behave
strategically is grounded on the investment made by the other party.
Once the investment is made, the opposing party can extract the rents
that are due to the investing party. Investment occurs only in
situations where employees are required to learn skills specific to the
firm. When learning firm-specific skills, employees must pay for their
training in part by accepting a below-market wage during the training
period. Having invested in the firm-specific skills, employees are then
In a recent essay, Cornell University Law Professor Stewart Schwab graphically
captures this phenomenon to some extent. Schwab, supra note 36, at 18. Players would
be vulnerable to "opportunistic" behavior in the region to the right of point "T" in
Professor Schwab's graph set forth below. Id.

Inside Wage
Inside Productivity

EFFCIENCY-WAGE STORY
Outside Wage

Opportunism Possible

Mid Career T Late Career
Id.(adapted from original).
44. See Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining,supra note 28, at 1361.
45. See id
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quite vulnerable to the employer because the employees' investment
in the firm-specific skills has given the employer the opportunity to
behave strategically.4 6
Thus, the Mackay rule ultimately leaves unprotected those
workers who are most vulnerable to opportunistic or strategic
employer behavior, that is, employees who have invested in firmspecific training. Under Mackay, these employees can be permanently
replaced (essentially, fired) by their employer during an "economic
strike" even though they have not yet economically recouped the
firm-specific investments they have made in the employer.4 7
On the other hand, if employees have not invested in firmspecific skills, but instead have acquired mainly general training, they
48
are less vulnerable to the employer's strategic behavior.
Employees who are mainly required to perform tasks that require
skills which are easily transferable in the external labor market do not
have to invest in below-market wages early in their careers.49 Thus,
even if their employment is terminated, as in the case of being
permanently replaced while on strike, employees have not suffered a
significant loss on their investment." As compared to the case of
firm-specific investments, the employer is not in a strategic position
to expropriate the employees' rents.
The skill specificity distinction also affects the union's ability to
behave opportunistically.5 ' The union will be in a position to impose
serious damage on employers in situations where the skills required
to perform work tasks are specific to the firm and require a substantial training period. In contrast, if the skills required to perform work
tasks are mainly of a general nature, the employer will be able to
5
continue operating by hiring essentially untrained temporary help."
Thus, we assert that a key distinction that should be made in the law
of striker replacements is one based on the type of skills possessed by
the workers involved in the strike. By focusing on that feature, the
law could prevent the use of the strike and the hiring of permanent
replacements as an opportunistic weapon designed to expropriate
either party's rents. Professor Corbett's procedural proposals, as
innovative as they are, do not address this problem.
46. See generallyid at 1358-64 (discussing workers' investments in firm-specific skills).

47. See 304 U.S. 333, 344-51 (1937).
48. Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining,supra note 28, at 1358-64.

49. Id
50. Id
51. See Cohen & Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers, supra note 28, at 113-19.
52. Id.
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PROCEDURAL REFORMS: NOT A WORKABLE SOLUTION

Professor Corbett defends his proposal on the grounds that it at
least protects strikers ("stays" the application of Mackay) until the
determination of the nature of the strike is decided, while at the same
time protecting employers against potential abuses by unions that
might result from an outright overruling of the Mackay doctrine. 3
However, the "protection" that his proposal supposedly provides
employees and unions is illusory, since it does not prevent opportunistic behavior by employers who permanently replace workers who have
made firm-specific investments.
In this section we argue that the protection that Professor
Corbett's proposal supposedly provides employers is equally illusory,
as dramatically illustrated by the high-profile 1993 Thanksgiving
holiday five-day flight attendant's strike at American Airlines. 4
Totally prohibiting employers from hiring permanent replacements
may, according to Professor Corbett's analysis, as well as our own
analysis of internal labor markets, allow unions to behave opportunistically." Thus, Professor Corbett suggests that any ban on the hiring
of permanent striker replacements should only be temporary pending
an expedited decision regarding the legal status of the strike. 6 He
appears to be opposed to the Clinton Administration's outright ban
on the hiring of permanent replacements by many employers, and has
noted that "there probably is not a meaningful distinction between a
long interim ban and an absolute prohibition on hiring permanent
replacements."57 Thus, Professor Corbett suggests that employers be
allowed to find out the nature of a strike as quickly as possible, and
with reasonable certainty, in order to make their own decision of
whether to hire permanent replacements." In the case of economic
strikes, Professor Corbett's proposal, in contrast to the Clinton
Administration's approach, prevents employers from hiring permanent
striker replacements only for a relatively short period of time.
The problem with the protection that Professor Corbett's
proposal gives employers, though, is that unions can behave quite

53. See Corbett, supra note 1, at 886-95.
54. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.

55. See Corbett, supra note 1, at 886-95.
56. Professor Corbett directly acknowledges, though, that even this temporary ban can
cause employers considerable trouble. See iLat 898-99.
57. Id. at 890.
58. See id. at 900-01.
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opportunistically even over relatively short periods of time. 9 That
is, even if the strike determination process is "expedited," unions
might still engage in opportunistic behavior against employers, since
it is probably impossible to "expedite" procedures enough to avoid
such a situation. For example, under Professor Corbett's proposal the
initial interim ban on all hiring of permanent replacement workers
would last until a determination is made by the Regional Director of
the NLRB whether to issue a formal complaint.' Professor Corbett
indicates that it has recently taken about forty-five days to reach this
determination.6
However, strikes in the United States tend to be of a much
shorter duration. Historically, the average strike has lasted less than
thirty-two days;' moreover, many strikes are of a shorter duration.
For example, the fall 1993 strike at American Airlines lasted only five
days, and was planned by the union to last no more than eleven days,
in part to inflict maximum damage on the employer during the busy
Thanksgiving holiday flying season.6' Thus, expedited reviews within
forty-five to forty-six days of the kind proposed by Professor Corbett
will obviously be of little benefit to many employers.'
IV.

PRESIDENT CLINTON'S EXECUTIVE ORDER: A WRONG STEP
IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION

We assert above that Professor Corbett's procedural proposal is
not logistically workable, and that it does not address the "core" issue
in the striker replacement debate: the motivation that exists for both
parties to behave opportunistically. Under Mackay, employers can
behave opportunistically by replacing striking workers who have made
significant, not yet recouped, firm-specific investments with permanent

59. Professor Corbett, while acknowledging the devastating impact his proposal might
have on some employers, asserts that employers have a variety of "options" for operating
during a temporary ban on hiring permanent replacements. Id. at 898-99. But, as noted
above, such "options" may not be all that viable where the employer needs to train
employees for firm-specific functions. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
60. Id. at 890-91.
61. Id. at 892 n.414.
62. See INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: A STUDY OF
INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES

317 (Greg J. Bamber & Russell D. Lansbury eds.,

1993); Peter Feuille & Hoyt N. Wheeler, Will the Real IndustrialConflict PleaseStand Up?,
in U.S. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 1950-1980: A CRrrIcAL ASSESSMENT 255, 260-61 (Jack
Stieber et al. eds., 1981).
63. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
64. Furthermore, such employers may be deprived of a critical opportunity to
permanently replace their workforce.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

replacements.65
President Clinton's Executive Order directly
addresses the concern of employer opportunistic behavior by
prohibiting large federal contractors from hiring permanent striker
replacements. As noted above, however, unions can also behave
quite opportunistically in some circumstances. 66 President Clinton's
Executive Order, which some observers have posited as a political
"sell-out" to the AFL-CIO,67 simply does not address the issue of
possible union expropriation of employer investments.
The new Executive Order states that the Executive Branch, in
order "to ensure the economical and efficient administration and
completion of Federal Government contracts," will not permit federal
agencies "to contract with employers that permanently replace
lawfully striking employees. ' , 6' The Executive Order mandates that
the Secretary of Labor investigate whether any "organizational unit
of a federal contractor"69 has hired permanent replacements, and if
so found, to "debar the contractor, thereby making the contractor
ineligible to receive [federal] government contracts."70
While raising a myriad of other interesting legal and policy
issues,7" the Executive Order is of particular interest to our analysis
because it appears to recognize, at least in part, the economic
relationship underlying the striker replacement situation. The Order
states:
An important aspect of a stable collective bargaining
relationship is the balance between allowing businesses to
operate during a strike and preserving worker rights. This
balance is disrupted when permanent replacement employees
are hired. It has been found that strikes involving per-

65. See Exec. Order No. 12954, 29 C.F.R. § 270.2 (1995).
66. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
67. See William F. Buckley, Jr., PresidentClinton: Short of Troops, NAT'L REV., Apr.
3, 1995, at 74-75; Glen Burkins, Clinton to Seek to Reinstate His Order Penalizing
Employers of Strike-Breakers,WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at A16; see also Catherine Yang,
Look Who's Feeding the Litigation Fire,Bus. WK., Sept. 18, 1995, at 150 (discussing the
view of U.S. Chamber of Commerce leadership that the Executive Order " 'was a cheap
shot from the President' ").
68. See Exec. Order No. 12954, 29 C.F.R. § 270.2(a) (1995).
69. Id.§ 270.11.
70. Id § 270.15.
71. See Labor Policy Association Memo On Legality Of Executive Order Sanctioning
FederalContractorsThat HirePermanentStrike Replacements,Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-2
(Mar. 8, 1995) (raising various constitutional problems concerning the validity of the
Executive Order on Striker Replacements); Striker Replacements: Executive Order
Denounced by Business, Defended by Labor,Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) AA-3 (Mar. 9, 1995)
(discussing concerns about the labor policy-making role of the President).
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manent replacement workers are longer in duration than
other strikes.
In addition, the use of permanent
replacements can change a limited dispute into a broader,
more contentious struggle, thereby exacerbating the
problems that initially led to the strike. By permanently
replacing its workers, an employer loses the accumulated
knowledge, experience, skill, and expertise of its incumbent
employees.7
Thus, the Executive Order recognizes the importance to the
striker replacement debate of the investments that workers and
employers make in firm-specific skills.' Although the Order does
not specifically address opportunistic behavior by employers, the
Administration's obvious awareness of the development of firmspecific skills played a role in its decision to prohibit federal contractors from hiring permanent striker replacements.
The Executive Order gives no indication, though, that labor
unions can also engage in opportunistic behavior. The Clinton
Administration's outright reversal of the Mackay doctrine as applied
to federal contractors thus potentially harms employers that have
made investments in firm-specific human capital and not yet recouped
their investments.74 Consequently, while affording employees of
federal contractors and their unions considerable protection, President
Clinton's Executive Order provides no protection to federal contractors themselves and permits unions and employees at various points
in time to extract the "rents" that are due to given contractor
employers.
A good example of this occurred during the aforementioned fall
1993 flight attendants' strike at American Airlines.75

The union's

timing of that strike was "opportunistic" not only because the strike
was scheduled during the Thanksgiving holiday, but also because it
72. Exec. Order No. 12954, 29 C.F.R. § 270.2 (1995) (emphasis added).
73. See Burkins, supra note 67, at A16 (quoting U.S. Secretary of Labor Robert
Reich's reaction to the appeals court's overturning of the Executive Order, and Reich's
statement that "rookie replacement workers" are brought in to replace better-trained
workers who make better quality goods).
74. See generally Lado & Wilson, supra note 30, at 705 (discussing employer
investments in firm-specific capital).
75. See Terry Maxon, Strike Hinders American PassengerFlights, Many Jets Carry
Only Cargo, Mail, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 19, 1993, at 1A, 24A. While it might
seem that President Clinton intervened because of union "pressure," there have been
allegations that the airline itself paid a very substantial sum to a Washington, D.C. lobbyist
to get President Clinton directly involved in the dispute. See James M. Perry, An Old
Friend of the Clintons' Stays Loya Spends Spare Time Doing Damage Control For
President,WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1994, at A18.
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was scheduled to last only eleven days: The union knew that the
airline was faced with a Federal Aviation Administration requirement
that airlines must train flight attendants at least ten days. Thus,
responding to threats by American Airlines Chairman Robert
Crandall to permanently replace virtually all of the striking flight
attendants, union president Denise Hedges simply responded, "I have
called an eleven day strike and the training takes ten days. I don't
see how they can replace ninety percent of our workers in eleven
days. '76 Under these circumstances, the airline ultimately acceded
to union demands for arbitration of the dispute, ending the strike
after only five days. 77 Even so, the airline attributed the vast
majority of a 1993 fourth quarter loss of $253 million to the strike."
In short, because of firm-specific investments required by the
company, which limited its ability to immediately hire permanent
replacement workers, the union was afforded the chance to behave
opportunistically. President Clinton's Executive Order in no way
curtails such opportunistic behavior by unions.
We argue that the proper solution to the striker replacement
debate is to make it more difficult for both parties to behave
opportunistically. We believe that a solution based on negotiations
provides the necessary monitoring and enforcing devices.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
A. Background
Among the goals of the NLRA is the promotion and encouragement of collective bargaining.79 The sponsors of the NLRA
viewed collective bargaining as the means to promote a new labor
policy without having to regulate the terms of the employment
relationship directly."0 In enacting the NLRA, Congress rejected a
76. See Maxon, supra note 75, at 24A. In contrast to the American Airlines situation,
if the skills required to perform work tasks are mainly of a general nature, the employer
will be able to continue operating by hiring untrained temporary help. In such a situation,
the union is not able to expropriate any rents. See Cohen & Wachter, Replacing Striking
Workers, supra note 28, at 118-19.
77. See Bruce Ingersoll & Bridget O'Brian, Clinton's Intervention Halts the Costly
Strike at American Airlines, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1993, at Al.
78. See Bridget O'Brian, AMR Posts Widened Fourth-PeriodLoss Largely on Effects
of Attendant's Strike, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1994, at A2.

79. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
80. See ARCHIBALD COX ET AL.,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 363 (1991);
see generally Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, IndustrialRelations in Transition: The
Paper Industry Example, 102 YALE L.J. 1803 (1993) (comparing the "old" and "new"

1996]

STRIKER REPLACEMENT REFORM

827

more interventionist approach ' and opted instead for a system that
emphasized the distinct roles of labor and management, in which
outcomes were to be determined by the ability of the parties to
impose economic pressure on each other through the negotiation
processn
It is somewhat paradoxical that, among the several alternatives
that have been advanced and more recently adopted to deal with the
striker replacement issue, Professor Corbett's proposal and President
Clinton's Executive Order included, there has been no direct attempt
to use the collective bargaining process as a possible solution."3 We
argue that by incorporating the striker replacement decision into the
bargaining process and letting the parties themselves debate over the
use of permanent replacements for economic strikers, opportunistic
behavior by both parties can be minimized while at the same time
advancing the NLRA's objectives of industrial peace and collective
bargaining.
The Advantages of Negotiation
The proposal we advance is based on the assumption that
through the negotiation process the parties themselves will be best
able to resolve disputes concerning the hiring of striker replacements.
They will accomplish this by making the necessary trade-offs and
establishing rules that commit them to mutually enforce the contract.
We submit that under the current general approach to striker
replacements, the Mackay rule, the decision to hire striker
replacements is not amenable to resolution through the collective
bargaining process. For example, under Mackay employers can hire
permanent replacements without consulting unions." This arguably
allows employers to get rid of unions by negotiating to points of
impasse and then hiring permanent replacements. 5 Facing this
outcome, employers currently have no real incentive to negotiate over
the striker replacement issue since any negotiation will by definition
make them worse off.

B.

industrial relation systems).
81. See COX ET AL., supra note 80, at 362.
82. Id. at 362-63.
83. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12954, 29 C.F.R. § 270.2 (1995); CHARLES CRAVER,
CAN UNIONS SURVIVE?: THE REJUVENATION OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
(1993); Corbett, supra note 1, at 885-902; Matthew T. Golden, On Replacing the
Replacement Worker Doctrine,25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 51, 85-89 (1991).
84. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1938).
85. See Cohen & Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers, supra note 28, at 117-24.
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Moreover, even if a given union places a high value on protecting
at least those employees who are subject to opportunistic behavior,
and even if the union is willing to compromise on the protection of
other (less-skilled) employees or on any other issue, no bargaining is
likely ever to take place under the Mackay rule. In this sense, the
Mackay doctrine makes it less likely that bargaining will take place,
and to that extent it is inefficient. 6 It is necessary, therefore, that
any reform proposal start by changing the initial allocation of rights,
which in this case means granting unions protection against the hiring
of permanent striker replacements.
On the other hand, giving unions protection against the hiring of
permanent replacements, without anything more, will also result in the
likelihood of opportunistic behavior by the unions.' If unions are
allowed to strike knowing that their members cannot be permanently
replaced, as President Clinton's Executive Order permits them to do
in the case of federal contractors, they will be free to engage in strikes
in ways tfiat expropriate rents that are due to employers.88
The solution we propose involves first providing striking workers
with protection against permanent replacement by changing the initial
legal right, and second, amending current law with respect to the
"bargaining status" of the striker replacement issue. Under current
judicial interpretations, the striker replacement issue has been deemed
to be a "permissive" subject of bargaining under the NLRA, that is,
a topic which parties are not required to bargain over and which
cannot be forced to a point of impasse at the bargaining table.8 9 We
propose that the law be amended to make this a clearly "mandatory"
subject of bargaining, requiringthe parties to bargain with respect to
it up to a point of impasse.'
86. In the presence of transaction costs, an important consideration will be to define
rights in a way that minimizes these transaction costs and permits efficient contractual
exchanges. See David D. Friedman, The World According to Coase, 38 LAW SCH. REC.
4, 9 (1992), for a brief but excellent description of some of the implications of the Coase
theorem.
87. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
88. See Peter G. Nash & Jonathan R. Mook, Strike Replacement Legislation: lfltAin't
Broke Don't Fix It, 16 EMPLOYEE REL. L.L 317, 319-20 (1990-91).
89. Bargaining subjects have been classified by the Supreme Court as mandatory,
permissive, or illegal. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342,349
(1958). Permissive issues are those dealing with legal subjects other than wages, hours, and
working conditions. See GORMAN, supra note 3, at 498.
90. For an extensive discussion of this proposal, see Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely,
Striker Replacements: A Law, Economics,and NegotiationsApproach, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
363, 384-96 (1995). Professor Corbett has just published a reply to our proposal. See
William R. Corbett, Taking the Employer's Gun and BargainingAbout Returning It. A
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Under this formulation we will make it more costly for employers
to behave opportunistically by forcing a strike in the hope of getting
rid of the union. Employers will be able to engage in this type of
behavior only by paying a fairly high price: closing operations.9 By
making the striker replacement issue a mandatory subject of bargaining, we minimize transaction costs by giving unions, the parties
which probably value this right the most,9' the opportunity to
Reply to "A Law, Economics, and Negotiation Approach" to Striker Replacement Law, 56
OHIO ST. L.J. 1511 (1995). We are currently formulating a response to his analysis.
Mandatory subjects are generally defined as those concerning wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). Parties are required to
bargain over mandatory subjects to a point of impasse. See Gorman, supra note 3, at 49698. All topics falling outside the mandatory rubric that are not illegal to bargain over are
deemed to be permissive subjects. See Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at
349. Parties are free to bargain and agree to contractual provisions regarding permissive
subjects, but they are not required to do so. See GORMAN, supra note 3, at 498.
Although a strong argument could be made that the issue of hiring striker
replacements should be a mandatory bargaining subject, to the extent that lower federal
courts have ruled on the issue, the consensus appears to be that it falls into the permissive
bargaining category. See NLRB v. Columbus Printing Pressmen's Union No. 252,543 F.2d
1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that a union bargained in bad faith when it insisted to
impasse on a provision requiring the parties to submit to arbitration disputes over the
negotiation of terms of contracts in subsequent agreements). Similarly, the D.C. Circuit,
in its Land Air Delivery, Inc. v. NLRB, 862 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1988) decision, found that
the hiring of permanent strike replacements does not fall into the same bargaining
category. Id. at 358 (holding that an employer's decision to permanently subcontract work
during a strike is a mandatory subject of bargaining). The appeals court noted that it
perceived a distinction "between replacing strikers with permanent employees and
replacing them with permanent subcontractors." Id. at 357. See generally COX ET AL.,
supra note 80, at 498 (raising rhetorically whether the striker replacements issue is a
mandatory or permissive bargaining subject but providing no elaboration).
91. As Wachter & Cohen point out, this sunk cost should deter illegal behavior. See
Wachter & Cohen, Collective Bargaining,supra note 28, at 1378-85.
92. The rationale for arguing that unions, rather than employers, will be more likely
to bargain over the striker replacement issue if given the initial legal entitlement, is based
on the realities of the industrial relations process. First, the protection against striker
replacement does not make the strike a risk-free venture for the union. As one
congressional report states: "The hardship of doing without a paycheck and health
insurance puts enormous pressure on the strikers to settle a dispute as soon as possible.
Most American workers have no cushion, no money socked away to make house payments
and car payments, to buy food or to pay doctors' bills." H. R. REP. No. 103-116, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 33 (1993), microfilm on SuP. Doc. No. Y 1.18:103-116/PT.1, at
33 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office).
Second, unreasonable pressures or unwillingness to bargain over this issue could
represent a matter of survival for the union. For example, the House of Represenatives
Report on the Cesar Chavez Workplace Fairness Act states: "Workers have no incentive
to make demands that will throw their employers into bankruptcy or otherwise cause
permanent economic harm to their employers. The worker, after all, is dependent on the
employer's long-term economic health. Workers realize this, and this realization
significantly moderates worker demands." Id.
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exchange the protection against permanent replacements for other
bargaining demands they might value more highly. In this sense, the
proposal facilitates bargaining by making more explicit the types of
exchanges the union has to make. 3
Our proposal also addresses what we see as the major flaw in
Professor Corbett's proposal. By overruling the Mackay rule, our
proposal effectively deters opportunistic behavior by the employer.
The hiring of permanent replacements would only occur within a
negotiated solution.
In addition, we submit that our proposal is superior to the
Clinton Administration's Executive Order in that it provides a more
balanced approach by requiring that the striker replacement issue be
negotiated during the course of the bargaining process. By making
the issue of the hiring of replacements for economic strikers a
mandatory bargaining topic, opportunistic behavior by unions should
be equally minimized, since union failure to negotiate in good faith
could result in statutory unfair labor practice charges being brought
against the union.'
CONCLUSION

In his recent article in the North CarolinaLaw Review Professor
William Corbett proposes an innovative procedural reforms to the
National Labor Relations Act with respect to the highly controversial
issue of employer rights to permanently replace workers during
economic strikes. We assert, however, that despite the creative nature
of these proposals, they are flawed. They are flawed because they do
not meaningfully address the issue of skill specificity and firm-specific
investments by both employers and employees in the context of the

93. Provisions similar to what our proposal envisions have in fact been negotiated on
a more limited scale. See 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) No. 1281, at
77:376 (July 7,1994). For example, the collective bargaining agreement between Olin Corporation and The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers states: "[T]he
Employees as well as the Union shall cross all picket lines for the performance of work
which is essential to the maintenance of the Company's plant and equipment for standby
operations." Id. The collective bargaining agreement between Harbison-Walker

Refractors and the Steelworkers states:
No strike or lockout shall occur at the establishment covered by this Agreement
during the life of this Agreement, and continuous kilns shall be maintained at all
times at a temperature which will result in no loss of ware or damage to the kilns,
and periodic kilns under fire shall be burned off. Pumping operations shall also
be continued during any strike or work stoppage that may occur as stated above.

Id. at 77"377.
94. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(3) (1988).
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striker replacement debate. Under the procedural reforms proposed
by Professor Corbett it appears that both parties will continue, in
economic strike situations, to be able to behave opportunistically with
respect to each other.
However, we also believe that simply overturning Mackay, as
exemplified in the federal contractor context by President Clinton's
recent Executive Order, represents an equally flawed approach.
Taken alone, the Clinton Administration approach still permits unions
to engage opportunistically in strikes which breach implicit
agreements parties have made under the internal labor market model.
To address this problem more meaningfully, we have briefly set
forth a possible alternative approach to reform. Our approach
involves a statutory overturning of the Mackay doctrine coupled with
a statutory amendment making the striker replacement issue a
mandatory subject of bargaining under the NLRA. The focus of our
proposal is on negotiation, on letting the parties themselves, without
outside intervention, resolve this important and complex issue.

